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Abstract
Background: Cigarette smoking takes a staggering toll on human health and attracts considerable
public health attention, yet real solutions seem distant. The 2004 Family Smoking Prevention and
Tobacco Control Act (US Senate bill S2461) would have given the US Food and Drug
Administration limited authority to regulate cigarettes to "protect the public health." However,
such legislation is unlikely to substantially reduce smoking or related deaths.
Discussion: The past 500 years of tobacco control efforts demonstrate that nicotine prohibition
is a practical impossibility for numerous reasons, state revenue being one of the most ominous. The
FDA already has regulatory authority over pharmaceutical grade nicotine products, and requires
pharmacists to dispense the most addictive of these only with prescriptions. Meanwhile, every
corner store can sell far more addictive and dangerous cigarettes to any adult. The FDA could
immediately increase competition between cigarettes and clean nicotine products by approving
available nicotine products for over-the-counter sales to adults. Similarly permissive regulation of
cigarettes and addictive nicotine products will reduce tobacco use and improve smokers' health,
but increase nicotine use in the population. Fortunately, restricted youth access and accurate
labeling of nicotine's absolute risks will dissuade many non-smokers from experimenting with it,
while accurate depiction of its risks relative to cigarette smoking will encourage many smokers to
switch. The FDA could take a series of small steps that might ultimately replace a large proportion
of cigarette smoking with equally addictive nicotine products, without risking serious public health
setbacks. Vaccine, methadone, and injury prevention policies establish relevant public health
precedents.
Summary: Cigarettes, or an equally addictive alternative, will be a permanent and common
product in most societies. Regulations restricting only the safest addictive nicotine products are
hard to justify. Addictive nicotine compliments other tobacco control strategies. Modern tobacco
control policies are applicable to addictive nicotine. Controlled trials and test market studies are
urgently needed to evaluate addictive nicotine as an alternative to smoking. Meanwhile, legislators
should preserve the Food and Drug Administration's option to permit non-prescription sales of
addictive nicotine.
Published: 24 February 2005
BMC Public Health 2005, 5:18 doi:10.1186/1471-2458-5-18
Received: 24 August 2004
Accepted: 24 February 2005
This article is available from: http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/5/18
© 2005 Sumner; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.BMC Public Health 2005, 5:18 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/5/18
Page 2 of 9
(page number not for citation purposes)
Background
Cigarette smoking is a source of worldwide misery [1,2]
and revenue for corporations and governments. Land-
mark tobacco regulatory efforts in the United States
include the 1992 Synar Amendment, requiring States to
establish and enforce prohibitions on the sale and distri-
bution of tobacco products to persons under 18 years of
age [3]. The 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA)
prohibited numerous marketing practices, especially
those likely to entice youth [4]. The six corporate signato-
ries also promised an endless series of payments to the set-
tling States, currently $8 billion annually. The United
States has endorsed the World Health Organizations'
2003 Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
(FCTC) [5]. The FCTC enumerates well-studied, politi-
cally safe measures such as taxation; limiting youth access;
regulating the content, packaging, advertising, and sales of
tobacco products; and educating the public about risks.
Fire-safe cigarettes [6] are now required in New York. Sev-
eral states and many municipalities now require smoke-
free workplaces.
The recently defeated [7] 2004 Family Smoking Preven-
tion and Tobacco Control Act, S2461 [8], would have
established Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regula-
tion of cigarettes for the first time. Although average citi-
zens could easily have taken "FDA regulation" to suggest
the extensive power that the FDA holds over pharmaceu-
tical products[9], tobacco regulations would have been
weaker. The defeated Act sought publication of brand-spe-
cific ingredient information; forbade adding children's
favorite flavorings to cigarettes, further restricted teen
sales and advertising; and allowed the FDA to regulate cig-
arettes' nicotine delivery. The FDA would not have been
able to ban or eliminate nicotine from cigarettes, nor
could the FDA ban a class of tobacco products. Although
modestly effective at preventing and ending tobacco use,
such measures will not achieve the Healthy People 2010
(HP2010) goal of 12% adult smoking prevalence [10] on
schedule [11], if ever. While cigarettes should never again
afflict more than a quarter of the United States popula-
tion, tobacco regulation will abate the current level of car-
nage only very slowly.
A complimentary strategy called "harm reduction" pro-
poses that smokers could improve their health by fre-
quently substituting less hazardous tobacco products,
such as 'smokeless cigarettes,' chewing tobacco, and newer
smokeless tobacco products for cigarettes [12-14].
'Smokeless cigarettes' are neither smokeless nor cigarettes,
but complicated devices that release a mixture of chemi-
cals from a heated tobacco substrate and can emit more
carbon monoxide than a cigarette [15-18]. For individuals
who are determined to inhale nicotine, these devices are
probably no worse than cigarettes. However, for individu-
als who would have quit instead of switching to a smoke-
less cigarette, the health cost may be large. The Institute of
Medicine has called for extensive research to quantify
harms and patterns of use of these "potential reduced
exposure products" (PREP) [19]. In contrast, chewing
tobacco is clearly safer than smoking cigarettes [20,21],
exposing users to as little as 2% of the risks of smoking
[22]. The newest smokeless tobacco products are discrete
enough to use in almost any social setting. Smokeless
tobacco products are much less popular than smoking in
the United States for a variety of reasons, including restric-
tions on advertising. However, the most important limita-
tion of smokeless tobacco may be absorption through the
nicotine through systemic veins rather than the pulmo-
nary vasculature. All current pharmaceutical nicotine
products share this limitation.
Some tobacco control advocates suggest a third strategy:
national policies encouraging competition between safer
nicotine products and cigarettes [20,23-34]. Typically, this
involves a "level playing field" with similar regulations for
pharmaceutical grade nicotine delivery systems and ciga-
rettes. Advocates cite evidence that health risk correlates
with exposure to tobacco's combustion and curing by-
products [35-38], with nicotine replacement products
posing the least risk [39,40].
There are different ways to level this playing field. At one
extreme, the FDA could increase regulation of cigarettes to
match that of nicotine products. This is politically chal-
lenging, as the FDA discovered in the 1990's [41], The
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
divided both the tobacco industry and the public health
community. Altria, corporate parent of Philip Morris, was
the only tobacco company to endorse this legislation.
Calling a similar bill the "Marlboro monopoly act" [42],
critics suspect that Altria hoped to discourage competi-
tion, for instance by encumbering smaller producers with
regulations, by prohibiting relative safety claims sought
by chewing tobacco manufacturers [43], or by discourag-
ing new products with stringent new standards [44,45].
Other critics believe that the Act safeguarded certain ciga-
rette marketing and legal defense strategies [9], or paved
the way for the company's unproven 'smokeless ciga-
rettes,' potentially ushering in another generation of
suffering.
At another extreme, the FDA could regulate other nicotine
products more permissively, as cigarettes have been regu-
lated. The FDA has that authority, but would face criticism
for facilitating a common addiction. For instance, the FDA
could approve non-prescription nicotine nasal sprays and
slow acting inhalers for indefinite use by adults. These nic-
otine replacement therapies have excellent safety records
and low potential for addicting non-smokers, although aBMC Public Health 2005, 5:18 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/5/18
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few ex-smokers become addicted. The widespread mis-
conception that nicotine prohibition is practical and
desirable makes it politically difficult for the FDA to pur-
sue this path.
Discussion
Problems with nicotine prohibition
A recent Lancet editorial called for the criminalization of
tobacco products [46]. However, a litany of centuries-old
problems with prohibition provides a strong argument for
permissive nicotine regulation as an alternative or essen-
tial prerequisite to prohibition. Many people will pay
high prices to a coalition of suppliers and governments to
obtain tobacco cigarettes that efficiently deliver nicotine,
a drug perceived to provide some benefits, in spite of sub-
stantial immediate and long-term risks of smoking. While
comprehensive public smoking restrictions are possible,
and some companies may exit the tobacco trade, tradi-
tional tobacco control and litigation may not provide
additional large public health gains in the United States,
and prohibition is a practical impossibility.
The first problem is that historically, smokers accept per-
sonal and public hazards that make the dangers we asso-
ciate with tobacco look quaint. After Christopher
Columbus failed to control his crew's tobacco use, mon-
archs from England to China tried to contain the weed by
execution, disfigurement, exile, and onerous taxation
[47]. Tobacco trade drained monarchs' wealth, compro-
mising national security, and smoking accidents inciner-
ated whole cities. Tobacco use spread anyway.
The second problem is that risk-tolerant smokers are no
small group. Smoking persists where Mormon and
Islamic prohibitions discourage it [48,49]. If 70% of
smokers in the USA want to quit [50]. then 30% of smok-
ers, more than 6% of the adult population, do not want to
quit.
The third problem is a common genetic predisposition to
nicotine addiction [51]. The modifiable risk factors we
associate with smoking initiation and persistence – parent
behavior, peer pressure, role models, advertising, accessi-
bility, repeated exposure, and perceived norms – were
irrelevant to Christopher Columbus' crew and the first
tobacco users across Eurasia. Risk factor modification will
not alter genetically predisposed users' fascination with
their first tobacco products.
The fourth problem is that so much money is involved.
When state and local taxes raised New York City cigarette
prices to US$7 per pack, tax revenues and black marketing
both increased [52]. During the invasion of Iraq, stressed
US soldiers reportedly paid up to US$50 per pack [53].
The black market for tobacco in Colorado prisons may
achieve a 45,000% markup [54]. This industry makes
large profits selling a simple product. If liability claims
bankrupt corrupt companies, new suppliers will fill the
void and try to avoid predecessor's mistakes. Black mar-
kets will undermine the benefits of high taxation or
prohibition.
The fifth problem is that government taxation compro-
mises tobacco control efforts. Historically, States willingly
trade citizens' health for wealth. Seventeenth century
monarchs who opposed smoking relented as tobacco tax
revenue accumulated. The States demonstrated the same
perverse values with petitions to protect their MSA pay-
ments when an Illinois court threatened Altria with a
US$12 billion bond [55]. The States will predictably pro-
tect the MSA corporate signatories from new competitors,
for instance with taxes targeting generic brands. Tax reve-
nues diminish prospects for even slowing the growth of
tobacco sales in Africa, Eurasia, and South America, and
prohibition in those areas is currently impossible.
The sixth problem is the lack of a popular mandate for
prohibition. Tobacco control advocates in the United
States are rightfully pleased with smoking's declining
prevalence, reduced teen smoking, rising cigarette prices,
spreading restrictions on public smoking, and fire-safe
cigarette initiatives. However, none of this demonstrates
popular support for prohibition. Citizens will balk at lim-
iting the supposedly personal choice to smoke in private.
Midwesterners have already rejected modest cigarette tax
hikes [56]. Furthermore, most taxes and MSA payments
subsidize programs that benefit non-smokers [57]. Prohi-
bition would eliminate that subsidy and require non-
smokers to pay for enforcement, a very unlikely prospect.
The seventh problem is that nicotine use could have a
favorable risk-benefit profile for some informed users.
Nicotine causes a mild euphoria without intoxication, in
contrast to more tightly regulated drugs: it does not
destroy relationships as intoxicating drugs routinely do.
Many smokers may use nicotine to treat various problems
[58-60] including depression [61], attention deficits [62],
other mental illness [63], symptomatic systemic diseases
[64], or to control weight [65]. Nicotine users may per-
form some tasks better, especially those involving vigi-
lance and rapid visual cue processing [66,67]. There is
uncertainty regarding many of these benefits [68]. Never-
theless, expected benefits are politically hard to withhold.
If some of these benefits are real, nicotine prohibition
may not even be desirable.
Nicotine accounts for very few of the long-term hazards of
smoking. A smokeless tobacco proponent has likened nic-
otine's risks to the risks of consuming caffeine [54]. Fetal
exposure causes placental constriction and reduced birthBMC Public Health 2005, 5:18 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/5/18
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size, alters brain development in disturbing ways, and
may increase susceptibility to later nicotine addiction [69-
76]. Nicotine might contribute to sudden infant death
syndrome [69,77-79], destruction of connective tissue
[80], modulation of immune function [81], prevention of
apoptosis [82,83], and alcohol or other substance abuse
[84-86]. Fatal nicotine poisoning is quite unlikely [87-
89]. Given that smokeless tobacco users experience only
about 2% of the risks of smoking [22], and that inhaled
nicotine is similarly benign in animal models [90-92], it
is very unlikely that inhaled nicotine could account for
even one-tenth of the harms of smoking.
In summary, however desirable tobacco prohibition may
be, it is hopelessly impractical – unless smokers, govern-
ments, and producers have an equally satisfying
alternative.
Stifling innovation
Legal and regulatory pressures have prevented the devel-
opment of meaningful alternatives to cigarettes. Directed
to approve drugs as "safe and effective" for specific indica-
tions, and to ignore tobacco, the FDA has had little reason
to approve chronic, addictive nicotine. Although the FDA
approves more dangerous drugs for specified indications,
without an indication there is no benefit to weigh against
any nicotine risk. Consequently the FDA requires pre-
scriptions for slow acting inhalers and nasal spray because
of a small risk of inconsequential addiction in ex-smokers.
Unfortunately, seemingly risk averse regulation of nico-
tine forces public health policies to rely on difficult smok-
ing prevention, cessation, use restrictions, and treatment.
The net effect is a risky public health policy, and very slow
development of new nicotine delivery systems [32].
Another unfortunate side effect has been that companies
put tobacco into any device that they do not want regu-
lated, particularly, 'smokeless cigarettes,' even if the device
would be safer without tobacco. In permissive nicotine
regulation, the FDA's missing indication is to improve nic-
otine addicts' safety. As prescription methadone substi-
tutes for illegal, immediately incapacitating heroin, non-
prescription nicotine could substitute for legal, slowly
injurious cigarettes.
Tort threats have also delayed product improvement
efforts within the industry. In 1963 an industry lawyer,
anticipating condemnation in the 1964 Surgeon General's
report, suggested competing on safe nicotine delivery, but
was overruled [93]. Product liability and regulatory issues
pushed tobacco companies into pointless projects includ-
ing filters, light cigarettes, "smokeless cigarettes", nico-
tine-free cigarettes, and fabricating a controversy over the
health risks of smoking.
Haddon matrix
In the mid 1960's, motor vehicle accidents were also tak-
ing a terrific health toll in the United States. While alter-
natives to driving existed, no one expected private
automobiles to disappear. Instead, systematic efforts
transformed traffic safety. Haddon's matrix illustrated
how complimentary strategies could work together to
reduce the morbidity and mortality of driving [94]. Table
1 shows a matrix with two axes representing time and
objects. Most injury control efforts fall into one of the
nine cells, although some cells are empty. Before an acci-
dent, typical preventive efforts remove or modify unsafe
drivers, vehicles, and road conditions. During an accident
a vehicle's design and environmental safeguards may pre-
vent or limit injuries. After an accident, prompt medical
attention limits the morbidity and mortality of the inju-
ries that still occur.
Table 1: Haddon's Matrix for Reducing Traffic Accident Injuries
Driver/Passenger Vehicle Environment
Before Accident Licensing
Stops, tickets, arrests
Drug, alcohol screening
Physician advice
Running lights
Antilock brakes
High traction tires
Vehicle inspections
Impact avoidance
Road design
Road maintenance
Road lighting, marking
Traffic law
Police patrols
During Accident ---- Bumpers
Seat belts
Airbags
Crumple zones
Fuel containment
Deformable barriers
Fences
After Accident ---- Fuel containment Telecommunications
Emergency stabilization
Emergency transport
Trauma centersBMC Public Health 2005, 5:18 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/5/18
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For tobacco control, smoking replaces accidents as the
focal event (Table 2 – anticipated strategies are italicized)
[95]. As with accidents, cells contain only partially effec-
tive interventions. Many people experiment with tobacco
in spite of efforts to prevent tobacco use. During smoking,
smokers quit infrequently in spite of warnings and medi-
cations. More effective smoking cessation products may
appear [96,97]. but some nicotine use will persist. In the
center cell, hazardous cigarettes easily dominate all avail-
able nicotine replacement products [98]. Available and
anticipated harm reduction products may be safer, but
addictive nicotine would be safer still. After injury, detec-
tion of disease may be slow, and treatments for tobacco-
related diseases are seldom curative. The matrix highlights
the problems of incomplete prevention, unsafe nicotine
sources, and poor treatment options, and demonstrates
why permissive nicotine regulation could benefit public
health: when prevention fails, results are bad. Making nic-
otine addiction as safe as possible would make prevention
failures less disastrous.
Proposal
For the reasons outlined above, the health benefits of
addictive pharmaceutical grade nicotine products would
likely outweigh the harms. If so, the FDA could improve
public health by regulating nicotine much as the govern-
ment has regulated cigarettes.
A permissive nicotine regulatory policy would allow sales
of pharmaceutical grade nicotine delivery systems to
adults without a prescription. The FDA could suggest
warnings appropriate for classes of products and delivery
system constituents. Manufacturers would accurately
label contents, and would be legally liable for undisclosed
harms caused by the delivery system and constituents
other than nicotine, as with any pharmaceutical product.
The FDA could prohibit inherently risky delivery systems,
and would undertake a full, traditional review of nicotine
systems that give users a faster or higher peak arterial level
of nicotine than cigarettes. The FDA would also review
additives intended to provide antidepressant or other
effects familiar to smokers [99,100]. Youth marketing and
access would be illegal, as with cigarettes. The Drug
Enforcement Agency would have no jurisdiction over
non-intoxicating nicotine products, just as it has no inter-
est in tobacco. Most public and workplace restrictions on
cigarette smoking would be irrelevant to other nicotine
delivery systems.
States could tax cigarettes and nicotine at different rates, in
theory recovering expenses related to each product. This
tax policy would discourage cigarette use, encourage
switching to nicotine, and maintain some State revenue as
cigarette sales decline. A satisfying, safe, legal, and afford-
able alternative to cigarettes would discourage black mar-
kets. The FDA and Federal Trade Commission could
permit advertising of nicotine as an alternative to smok-
ing, and monitor relative harm claims. Nicotine manufac-
turers would pay for monitoring of adverse health effects
from their products until remaining health questions are
answered.
The FDA could implement a permissive policy in a series
of simple, informative steps. First, the FDA could immedi-
ately approve non-prescription sales of the existing nico-
tine spray and inhaler, and similar competitors, with
restraints consistent with the Synar amendment, the MSA,
and the FCTC. In particular, it should require disclosure of
known nicotine risks, such as addiction, invite compari-
sons to smoking risks, and forbid marketing to minors.
Table 2: Haddon's matrix adapted to tobacco control
Potential user Nicotine delivery device Environment
Before Addiction Addiction education
Disease education
Counter-advertising
Warning labels
Labeling regulations
Youth sales restrictions
Taxation
Black market policing
Prohibition
During Use Disease education
Cessation advertising
Bupropion
Nortiptylline
Varenicline [105],
Rimonabant [97]
Filters
Low tar cigarettes
Smokeless tobacco
Smokeless cigarettes
Content regulation
Nicotine replacement
Addictive inhalers
Taxation
Prohibition
After Injury Disease awareness
Cessation advice
Nicotine replacement
Addictive inhalers
Disease screening
Disease treatment
CuresBMC Public Health 2005, 5:18 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/5/18
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Data collected during this first step will inform subse-
quent steps. Economists have shown that the price of nic-
otine gum and patches affects demand for cigarettes
[101]. This means that some smokers will substitute less
expensive but very slow acting nicotine replacement prod-
ucts for cigarettes. Non-prescription access to more addic-
tive and competitively priced nicotine should increase this
substitution, especially if addicts can purchase a one day
supply of about 20 mg. Clinical trials and post-marketing
studies of non-prescription use of the spray and inhaler
would begin to answer questions about nicotine and preg-
nancy, substance abuse, and heart disease. Surveillance
studies would determine whether clean nicotine options
lead more people to smoke, to smoke longer, or to use
nicotine during pregnancy. While the Institute of Medi-
cine recommends years or decades of study to quantify the
risks of "smokeless cigarettes", the most important
remaining uncertainties about nicotine might be
answered in a few years. Data collected during this first
step should document the relative safety of addiction to
pharmaceutical nicotine versus cigarettes, the market
share of each product, and the increase in total nicotine
use. Analyses using these data will predict the conse-
quences of more permissive regulation [102].
If experience with the current nicotine spray and inhaler is
reassuring, the FDA can take a second step, to approve
clearly addictive nicotine inhalers for non-prescription
use. These fast acting inhalers will deliver nicotine in a
powder [103] or aerosol to the alveoli, as pulmonary
inhalers deliver steroids and beta agonists. Fast acting nic-
otine inhalers would be subject to the same marketing
requirements and surveillance described above.
Several trends could develop that encourage smokers to
switch to addictive nicotine inhalers, while limiting
recruitment of non-smokers. Smokers will appreciate the
healthier alternative to cigarettes, especially as they
develop smoking related illnesses, while warning labels
will discourage casual experimentation by non-smokers.
Smoke-free workplace regulations would spread with less
controversy, as fast acting inhalers give smokers a reason-
able alternative. Employers might voluntarily forbid
smoking to reduce health care and workman's compensa-
tion costs; reduce workplace fires; and increase productiv-
ity by eliminating both smoking breaks and withdrawal
symptoms. Physicians might strongly encourage smokers
to switch for their own health, primarily, but also for the
health of family members. The government might permit
more aggressive advertising of nicotine inhalers to further
undermine cigarette smoking. Governments will probably
find nicotine taxation irresistible, especially if their
tobacco revenue declines. Nicotine taxation will raise the
cost of experimenting with inhalers beyond some teen-
ager's means. Communities might press smokers to switch
so that fire departments, health care providers, and
research funding agencies could shift resources to many
other pressing problems. Ultimately, palatable inhaled
nicotine products could finally allow governments to ban
tobacco cigarettes.
The public health benefits of these policy shifts could be
substantial. We can estimate the long term relative public
health burdens of different policies as the product of the
risks posed by a delivery system, relative to cigarettes, and
the fraction of the adult population using it. Using this
formula, the current burden is more than 20% use × 100%
risk = 0.2. Healthy People 2010 calls for 12% use × 100%
risk = 0.12, about half of the current burden. If nicotine
accounted for a surprising 10% of smoking risks, elimi-
nating smoking by quintupling the prevalence of inhaled
nicotine use – universal addiction – would cause 100%
use × 10% risk = 0.1, a slight improvement over HP2010.
A slightly less pessimistic scenario would be that all past
and present smokers become inhaled nicotine addicts, but
their risk is only twice that of smokeless tobacco users.
This scenario is no more than 70% use × 4% risk = 0.028,
about a quarter of the HP2010 burden. The most likely
scenario is that nicotine risks are about 2% of smoking
risks, and that policy changes will slowly shift the proba-
bilities that smokers will attempt and succeed in quitting,
that smokers will switch to nicotine indefinitely or use
both nicotine and cigarettes, that ex-smokers relapse to
nicotine use, and that non-smokers begin using nicotine.
If the risks of inhaled nicotine are this low and if at least
one smoker can switch to addictive inhaled nicotine for
every 50 ex-smokers and non-smokers who start using nic-
otine, then public health will benefit from permissive nic-
otine regulation. One public health risk is that more
people might begin or continue smoking cigarettes in the
belief that inhaled nicotine will provide an easy escape
path, but suffer irreparable harm before switching. We
should quantify these probabilities through surveillance
of the public's behavior and health consequences follow-
ing each step toward more permissive nicotine regulation.
Although S2461 was defeated, the continuing carnage will
motivate similar legislative proposals. Tobacco policies
must preserve the possibility of permissive nicotine regu-
lation. Bad legislation could solidify the position of ciga-
rettes, delay safer products, prohibit disclosure of relative
harms, or otherwise interfere with market forces that
ought to benefit nicotine addicts [104]. The FDA must
retain the option to unleash real competition against a
disastrous status quo in the tobacco industry.
Summary
Nicotine use will remain common indefinitely. Pharma-
ceutical grade nicotine is the safest known substance that
could replace cigarettes, but inherently addictive productsBMC Public Health 2005, 5:18 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/5/18
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are required to compliment traditional tobacco control
policies effectively. The FDA could apply restrictions, sim-
ilar to those on cigarettes, to an increasingly addictive
portfolio of nicotine products, requiring honest portrayals
of absolute and relative risks, and expect a significant
reduction in cigarette smoking and related illness with
modest recruitment of new nicotine addicts at each step.
A brief and focused research effort could solidify the
already substantial justification for such permissive nico-
tine regulation. Meanwhile, federal legislation must not
obstruct free market ideals of competitive innovation and
informed consumption.
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